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MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT
LEGISLATION CONCERNING ALLIED
HEALTH PRACTITIONERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The shortage of primary care physicians' and the growing consumer
demand2 for quality health care have been major factors contributing to
the need for the two types of allied health practitioners3 known as
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas V. Girardi, Professor
of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, in the preparation of this comment. Further
acknowledgment is given for the courtesy and cooperation of Dale Houghland, William H.
Burnett, and Edward Smeloff of the Office of Health Professions Development, Califor-
nia State Department of Health.
1. See Andrus & Fenley, Assistants to Primary Physicians in California, 122 W.J.
MED. 80 (1975); Jones & Hamburger, Physician Supply in California, 123 W.J. MED. 250
(1975). See also CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER POLICY COMMISSION, THIRD ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA
HEALTH MANPOWER REPORT].
2. See A. FORD, THE PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT 35-36 (1975); Lawrence & Callen, The
Demand for New Health Practitioners, in NEW HEALTH PRACTITIONERS 13 (Nat'l Insts. of
Health, DHEW Pub. No. 75-875, 1974).
3. This category of health worker evolved in response to the paucity of doctors and the
resulting inability of the medical profession to deliver needed health care to many Califor-
nia residents. See note 7 infra. The allied health practitioners are neither replacing the
physician nor providing a substitute for medical care. Rather, they are bringing physi-
cians' services into areas which otherwise would probably not be reached due to the
shortage and maldistribution of physicians. See note 1 supra. They represent a viable
means of meeting the health care needs of the people of the state. For an interesting
discussion of the development of allied practitioners in California, see Ver Steeg, Devel-
opment of Physician's Assistants and Nurse Practitioners in California, 51 BULL. N.Y.
ACAD. MED. 286 (1975).
Discussions of allied health practitioners, also known as midlevel medical practitioners,
must include both nurse practitioners and physician's assistants. These two occupational
titles are currently the most widely accepted in the health field. Throughout this comment,
physician's assistants and nurse practitioners will be discussed in their respective roles as
providers of health care.
The use of allied health practitioners to reduce costs and solve manpower shortages in
the field of health care parallels the innovative use by the legal profession of legal
paraprofessionals to assist lawyers in supplying legal services. Just as the allied health
practitioner is not legally entitled to engage in the independent practice of medicine, the
legal paraprofessional is not qualified to engage in the independent practice of law, but
must be supervised and controlled by a licensed member of the legal profession. See
generally Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering Process Through a New Delivery System:
The Emergence and State of Legal Paraprofessionalism, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 (1971);
Brown, Preventive Law and the Legal Assistant, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1181 (1971); Early,
The Need for Legal Nurses, 74 CASE & COM. 34 (Sept.-Oct. 1969); Smith, Vertical
Expansion of the Legal Services Team, 56 A.B.A.J. 664 (1970).
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physician's assistants4 and nurse practitioners.5 Coupled with a maldis-
tribution of physicans, 6 these factors have resulted in inadequate health
care in some areas of California,7 particularly in rural and inner city
areas.
8
California laws and regulations have kept a tight rein on physician's
assistants and nurse practitioners. 9 Recently, however, efforts have been
4. There are different specialty levels of physician's assistants, see note 81 infra, but
for the purposes of this comment, physician's assistants are assistants to the primary care
physician. They are usually generalists, able to perform varied procedures, and the first
persons to come into contact with the patient. They can increase the physician's efficien-
cy and effectiveness by performing tasks that are often time consuming and repetitious.
Additionally, physician's assistants can be trained in a relatively short period of time,
thereby increasing the availability of health manpower. They can perform many medical
tasks traditionally performed by physicians, but not requiring their extensive skill and
knowledge, and can be placed in shortage areas.
Nationally, the concept of the physician's assistant has been fully supported by the
federal government. A. SADLER, B. SADLER, & A. BLISS, THE PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT-
TODAY AND TOMORROW 1-2 (1975). See also Fox & Cooper, Federal Policy Issues in the
Introduction and Long-Term Support of Physician Extenders, in INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL
HEALTH PRACTITIONERS 14 (1973).
5. The term nurse practitioner has been variously used. Advisory Comm. on Physi-
cian's Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Programs, The Development, Education, and
Utilization of Nurse Practitioners in the State of California 14 (final report, Dec. 4, 1973).
In this comment, reference to nurse practitioners encompasses registered nurses operating
in an expanded role in giving primary care. Such health care providers have training
beyond that required of registered nurses. They can deliver primary health and medical
care pursuant to the California Nursing Practice Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2700-
2830 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978). They have the ability to -[a]ssess the health status of
individuals and families through health and medical history taking, physical examinations,
and defining of health and developmental problems." CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER
REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. This definition was adopted by the Health Manpower Policy
Commission because there is currently no legally defined entity entitled "nurse practition-
er" in California. See Law of Aug. 29, 1977, ch. 439, § 2, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified
at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2834-2837). Nurse practitioners can significantly decrease
the cost of health care without sacrificing quality. V. HALL, STATUTORY REGULATION OF
THE SCOPE OF NURSING PRACTICE-A CRITICAL SURVEY 3 (1975).
6. CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER REPORT, supra note 1, at I. See also Jones &
Hamburger, Physidian Supply in California, 123 W.J. MED. 250 (1975).
7. According to projections, California is not training sufficient numbers of family
physicians to counterbalance the state's shortage. Even more disheartening is the belief of
state health leaders that, at the current rate residents are being trained, California's
shortage will become greater every year. CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER POLICY
COMMISSION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 22 (Dec. 15,
1975). See also Jones & Hamburger, Physician Supply in California, 123 W.J. MED. 250
(1975).
8. CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. See generally J.
ACTON, DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE AMONG THE URBAN POOR, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON THE ROLE OF TIME (RAND Corp. No. 1151, 1973).
9. For a discussion of these laws and some examples and evidence that they remain
overly restrictive with respect to widespread usage of physician's assistants and nurse
practitioners, see Oseran, Physician's Assistants in California, 124 W.J. MED. 258, 262
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made to reduce the constraints imposed by those laws.10 In the face of
growing demands being made on our health care system,"' state health
and government leaders have become increasingly concerned about the
shortage and maldistribution of health care personnel.12 They recognize
that both physician's assistants and nurse practitioners hold great poten-
tial for the improvement of health care services in underserved rural and
inner city areas. 13 Further, they are eager to have these allied health
practitioners assume greater responsibility for patient welfare in health
care deficient areas.
14
With the recent enactment of Assembly Bill 717 (A.B. 717),15 the
legislature took a major step in encouraging the widespread utilization of
physician's assistants and nurse practitioners. 16 The law authorizes a pilot
project 17 permitting the prescription, dispensation, and administration of
(1976). "Legal problems associated with the use of a PA [physician's assistant) or NP
[nurse practitioner] have been cited as potential obstacles to the acceptance and full
utilization of these new health providers." A. FORD, THE PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT 113
(1975).
10. Legislative proposals regarding the expanded use of allied health practitioners have
been enacted in several other states, including Michigan. Physician's Assistants Act,
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.1951-.1978 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.718(11)-(38) (Callaghan
1977)). The Michigan law enables physician's assistants to give various medical treatments
under direct or radio contact with a physician, conduct physical examinations, suture
minor wounds, administer certain tests, apply or remove casts, and write prescriptions for
all drugs except controlled substances. Id. § 338.1967 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.718(27)).
11. CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
12. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1185 (West Supp. 1978) (requiring State
Department of Health to implement program of health services development projects to
remedy deficiencies in health services in rural areas). The statement of intent declares that
"[t]here is a maldistribution of health services in California. Most rural areas of the state
do not have adequate health services because there are insufficient health personnel ...
It is unlikely that the situation will improve without substantial state and local action." Id.
§ 1185(a), (d).
13. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31910 (West 1976). See CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Benton, Allied Health Personnel and Health-Manpower
Problems, 52 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1144, 1144-45 (1976).
14. See Andrus & Fenley, Assistants to Primary Physicians in California, 122 W.J.
MED. 80, 81 (1975).
15. Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, §§ 1-25, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified in scattered
sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE).
16. One of the major concerns in the training of allied health practitioners is whether
they will actually work in the geographical areas where there is the most medical need.
With the enactment of A.B. 717, those practitioners will be able to perform in medically
underserved areas the functions for which they were trained. But it remains to be seen
whether they will be deployed to, or remain in, those areas where they are most needed.
17. A health manpower pilot project is, for the purposes of A.B. 717, an educa-
tional or training program approved by the California Department of Health. Once
the Department of Health approves the project, those persons who are to be taught the
health care skills are thereafter empowered to perform "health care services" under the
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specific drugs or devices 18 by physician's assistants and by registered
nurses' 9 operating in expanded roles as nurse practitioners,20 under the
"general supervision" of a licensed physician.2 Reflecting the legisla-
ture's understanding of the need for primary health care in medically
underserved areas, A.B. 717 requires that projects which operate in rural
and central city areas be given priority. 22 Under existing California law,
physician's assistants and nurse practitioners have not been sanctioned to
prescribe, dispense, or administer drugs; to permit them to do so has
been a violation of the law. 23 With legislative approbation, the physician
general supervision of their supervisor. See Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, §§ 1-25, [1977]
Cal. Stats. - (codified in scattered sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE and CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE). The Department of Health may, on a pilot program basis,
either (1) teach new skills to existing categories of health personnel, or (2) accelerate the
training of existing categories of health care personnel. Id. § 13 (codified at CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 429.71).
18. A device is defined as:
any instrument, apparatus, or contrivance, including any component, part, product,
or by-product of a device, or accessory, which is used, or intended for use, for any of
the following:
(a) In the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man
or any other animal.
(b) To affect the structure or any function of the body of man or any other animal.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26009 (West Supp. 1978). See also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 383 (4th Law. ed. 1976). For a discussion of paramedical practitioners and the
use of medical devices, see Leff, Medical Devices and Paramedical Personnel: A Prelimi-
nary Context for Emerging Problems, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 332.
19. The bill would also permit pharmacists to carry out the same functions. Law of
Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, § 5, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
4037.1). This comment, however, confines itself to allied health practitioners.
20. The language of the bill specifies registered nurses. However, it deals in reality with
only those registered nurses operating in expanded roles, that is, nurse practitioners.
Interview with Dale Houghland, Chief, Office of Health Professions Development,
California State Department of Health, in Ventura, California (Aug. 3, 1977). The reason
for the wording of the bill is that, at the time of its last senate hearing, California law made
no provision for the use of the term "nurse practitioner." See Law of Aug. 29, 1977, ch.
439, § 2, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2834-2837).
However, the legislature has found that the public interest would be served by determina-
tion of the legitimate use of the title "nurse practitioner" by registered nurses. Id. The
California Board of Nursing Education and Nurse Registration must establish categories
of nurse practitioners and standards for use of the term. Id. The law should bring an end
to the various conflicting definitions of the nurse practitioner that have been created by
state agencies and private organizations within California. Id. Further support for the
contention that A.B. 717 refers td expanded role nurse practitioners is found in the law
itself. The law states that pilot projects may be approved for expanded role medical
auxiliaries and expanded role nursing. Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, § 14, [1977] Cal.
Stats. - (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 429.77).
21. Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, §§ 1,2, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified at CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 2725.1, 3502.1).
22. Id. § 14 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 429.77).
23. "No person other than a physician, dentist, podiatrist or veterinarian shall pre-
scribe or write a prescription." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4036 (West 1975). But note that
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will be freed of the risk of illegally 24 delegating those responsibilities.
Still, a major problem in extending the scope of an established health
profession is the attendant civil liability. In order to assist the practicing
attorney in gaining a proper perspective of the effect of this recent
legislation, this comment will assess the provisions of A.B. 717 and
examine the potential medico-legal significance of the bill. Theories of
liability will be discussed, with emphasis on California law.
U. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "GENERAL SUPERVISION" REQUIREMENT
A major factor in the efficient utilization of allied health personnel is
that of supervision. A.B. 717 specifically calls for "general supervi-
sion, ' 25 which is a nebulous concept. Use of such an undefined term
provides flexibility,26 allowing the regulatory agencies to meet problems
that may develop, but it also raises problems in practical application.
Does "general supervision" mean physical presence or something less?
If only "general supervision" is required, will the supervising physician
have the ultimate legal responsibility for the activities of the allied health
practitioner? Does "general supervision" imply that a physician's assis-
tant or a nurse practitioner will be exercising independent judgment in
prescribing treatments and drugs? Such questions must be addressed
if the dispensation or administration of drugs is authorized by a pilot project, California
law presently allows an allied health practitioner to dispense or administer drugs upon a
valid prescription from a person licensed to prescribe drugs. California Department of
H.ealth Legal Opinion from Charles M. Bonneau, Office of Legal Affairs, to Dale Hough-
land, Chief, Health Manpower Development Section (April 23, 1976) (copy on file in
the office of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). A.B. 717 alters the limitations of
§ 4036 by permitting either a registered nurse or a physician's assistant acting within the
scope of an authorized project to prescribe or write a prescription. Law of Sept. 15, 1977,
ch. 843, § 4, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4036). Thus,
the legislation will extend the range of services that the allied health practitioner can
provide.
24. Although A.B. 717 will not overturn existing statutory prohibitions against the
prescribing of drugs by non-physicians, see note 23 supra, it provides an exception to
those prohibitions. Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, § 4, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified at
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4036).
25. Id. §§ 1, 2 (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2725.1, 3502.1).
26. Since the legislature did not clearly express its intention to provide a flexible
approach, the approach adopted may have been fortuitous. Nevertheless, rigid ap-
proaches do npt take into account the constant flow of new health care procedures and
concepts or the need for the most effective utilization of allied health practitioners. The
apparent flexible supervision formula of A.B. 717 will enable physician's assistants
and nurse practitioners to utilize their training and experience fully and to function in
areas geographically separated from the supervising physician. "The danger is that strict
prior controls may become rigid, thus unduly limiting expanded medical delegation."
Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Laws for Expanded Medical Dele-
gation, in THE NEw HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 125 (1977).
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before the legal ramifications of the legislation can be ascertained.
A. Physical Presence or Something Less?
The language of the law suggests that the physical presence of the
supervising physician is not required. The term "general supervision" is
a retreat from the former restrictive approach to physician's assistant
supervision in California.27 Whether the new language allows supervi-
sion of allied health practitioners via direct communications, either by
telephone, radio, or telecommunications, remains an open question. 28
But such a communications system is consistent with the purpose of
A.B. 717 because it would enable more people in medically underserved
areas to receive adequate health care. With the employment of such
communications, allied health practitioners can work at great distances
from the physician and exercise independent judgment relating to treat-
ment while remaining legally "dependent" because their actions are
subject to medical review and direction. 29 While the ultimate interpreta-
tion of "general supervision" remains for the future legislative or judi-
cial determination, the term seems to indicate a reasonableness standard
to help meet the goal of both quality and accessibility of health care
services.
B. Critical Evaluation: Who Has Ultimate Legal Responsibility
30
Under the Terms of the Legislation?
1. Respondeat Superior
The framework instituted by the legislature for the more extensive use
of allied health care personnel raises the question of who has ultimate
27. In California, the level and type of requisite physician's assistant supervision has
been outlined by the state administrative agency that must approve physician's assistants,
and not the legislature. Compare CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 1379.22 (1972) (very
restrictive approach regarding physician assistant supervision) with CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 16, § 1379.22 (1977) (modifying the earlier supervision requirement). The question
therefore remains open as to whether the legislature, in A.B. 717, has dictated a similar
supervisory arrangement for both of the allied health practitioners. To answer this
question, a clarification of the supervision requirement must come from the legislature
and/or the courts.
28. The Michigan Physician's Assistants Act has adopted a definition of supervision
which allows communication by telephone, radio, or telecommunications. Physician's
Assistants Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1952(k)(i) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.718(12) (k)(i)
(Callaghan 1977)). See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 1379.22 (1977) (allowing electronic
supervision of physician's assistants).
29. See generally Cohen & Dean, To Practice or Not to Practice: Developing State Law
and Policy on Physician Assistants, 52 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 349, 363-67 (1974).
30. Since the allied health practitioners engage in the primary care of patients, including
recommending and giving treatments to patients, they will have certain legal respon-
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responsibility for the patient's care." Established rules impose legal
liability upon a physician for patient injuries caused by the conduct of
subbrdinates.32
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer is liable for
the acts of his employees or agents.33 When this doctrine is applied in
health care situations, the physician has primary responsibility for the
physician's assistant or nurse practitioner he employs. The employee,
however, is also liable.3 4 Therefore, a patient who suffers injury because
of the negligence of an allied health practitioner has recourse against both
the physician and the allied practitioner, and may sue either or both for
damages.3 5 The physician is ultimately responsible because while he
delegates to the allied health practitioner certain aspects of the prescribed
treatment, he retains control and supervision, thereby establishing a
principal-agent relationship. a6
An employer may temporarily lend his employees to a third person. To
find liability under respondeat superior when such a relationship exists, it
must be determined who the employer was at the time of the negligent
act. This depends on who had the right at the time to control and direct
the allied health practitioner employee. If the power of direction and
control lay with the temporary or special employer, he becomes responsi-
sibilities. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra. This section of the comment confines
itself to the question of who will have the ultimate legal responsibility under the terms of
the legislation.
31. Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, §§ 1-25, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified in scattered
sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE). Compensation
of those injured is an important policy consideration; the basis of vicarious liability is one
of policy. I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 116.01, at 488 (1973).
32. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 162 (1972).
33. Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 265, 288 P.2d 1003, 1014 (1955), disapproved
on other grounds, West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469,478, 353 P.2d 929,934, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 289, 294 (1960), and Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 667, 328
P.2d 449, 451 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); Sagall & Reed,
Legal Responsibility for Negligence of Assistants, Substitutes, Partners, Consultants, and
Jointly Treating Physicians, in MEDICINE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 218 (1975).
34. Allied health practitioners are vulnerable to lawsuits under the rule that an employ-
ee, agent, or servant is always responsible for his own torts, whether his employer is liable
or not. Bayuk v. Edson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 309, 320, 46 Cal. Rptr. 49, 56 (1965).
35. W. SELL, AGENCY 83 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217B (1958).
36. For a discussion of the liability of principals for an agent's torts see W. SELL,
AGENCY 95 (1975). The true test of whether the relationship of principal and agent exists is
whether the physician actually exercises supervision and control over the allied health
practitioner during the time he uses his services. Id. at 15; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
TORTS 1366 (1956). Other reasons for attaching the ultimate responsibility to the supervis-
ing physician are compensation to the victims and loss spreading. Note, Tort Liability and
the California Health Care Assistant, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 768,786 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Tort Liability].
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ble for the negligence of the employee.37 For example, a physician may
lend the service of a nurse employee to another for a brief period of time
and for a specified service. In such a case, the individual who directs the
nurse will be responsible for his negligent acts while that individual
exercises actual supervision over him.
38
2. Employee or Independent Contractor?
Since the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable only when an
employer-employee relationship exists, the pivotal issue in determining
whether a physician will be liable for the negligence of an allied health
practitioner is whether the negligent person may be considered an em-
ployee or an independent contractor. If the allied health practitioner is an
independent contractor39 or independent professional rather than an agent
or employee, the supervising physician may not be liable for conduct of
the allied health practitioner when carried out independently and not
under his supervision or control. 4°
In order to determine the character of an allied health practitioner's
employment at the time of a negligent act, attention should be focused on
whether he was acting as an agent, employee, or servant of the physician
or was at that time outside the supervision and control of the physician.
In California, physician's assistants are legally dependent on their super-
vising physicians. Thus, they fall squarely within the parameters of a
principal-agent relationship.
As there is little difference in the duties performed by a physician's
37. Deorosan v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 599, 604, 332 P.2d 422, 425
(1958); Lowell v. Harris, 24 Cal. App. 2d 70, 76-77, 74 P.2d 551, 555-56 (1938); St. Paul-
Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558,560,4 N.W.2d 637,638 (1942);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227, Comment a (1958).
38. Cf. Synnott v. Midway Hosp., 287 Minn. 270, 178 N.W.2d 211 (1970) (nurse held
to be borrowed servant of surgeon insofar as his services related to work controlled,
directed, and supervised by surgeon).
39. Generally, an independent contractor is a person who, while exercising an
independent employment, contracts to do work according to his own methods and without
the control of the employer, except as to the result of the work. Donroy, Ltd. v. United
States, 301 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir. 1962). Recent legislative trends, such as A.B. 717
and Michigan's new Physician's Assistants Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.1951-.1978
(MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.718(1 1)-(38) (Callaghan 1977)), may permit physician's assistants
and nurse practitioners to enter into limited independent practices in primary care. This,
as the above definition suggests, does not necessarily make them independent contrac-
tors. In Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96, 78 P. 337 (1904), the court said: "The chief
consideration which determines one to be an independent contractor is the fact that the
employer has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for." Id. at
99, 78 P. at 339. As to independent contractors generally, see 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Independent
Contractors §§ 1-28 (1977).
40. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 16.03, at 491 (1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250, Comment a (1958).
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assistant and a nurse practitioner,41 arguably the same legal problems
confront both groups. However, the nurse practitioners oppose being
associated with the physician's assistants. They maintain that by defini-
tion, the physician's assistant is a physician-dependent health care work-
er, always working under the supervision, direct or indirect, of a physi-
cian. They make the point that, while physician's assistants are osten-
sibly in every case subordinate to a supervising physician,42 nurse prac-
titioners derive their authorization to practice from the state's Nursing
Practice Act43 and may therefore practice independently. 4
Since nurse practitioners insist on occupational independence, and
since it can be argued that their relationships conform to the criteria for
independent contractors, 45 separate attention will here be given to those
practitioners.
3. Can the Nurse Practitioner Truly Be an Independent Professional-
Not Under the Control of the Physician?
Considerable research has recently been conducted on the increased
utilization of nurse practitioners to provide health care on a more equi-
table basis. 46 Current efforts are designed to utilize nurse practitioners in
physician-deprived primary health care areas47 where they can make
41. Andrus & Fenley, Assistants to Primary Physicians in California, 122 W.J. MED.
80, 81 (1975). See also Glenn & Goldman, Task Delegations to Physician Extenders-
Some Comparisons, 66 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 64 (1976). The latter article examines the
delegation of tasks to physician's assistants and nurse practitioners to determine the
impact on productivity, finding no distinction between delegation patterns for nurse
practitioners and physician's assistants.
42. H. CREIGHTON, CHANGING LEGAL ATrITUDES: THE EFFECT OF THE LAW ON NURS-
ING 13-14 (1974); Mauksch, Nursing Is Coming of Age Through the Practitioner Movement:
Pro, 75 AM. J. NURSING 1834, 1842 (1975).
43. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2700-2830 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
44. See E. COHEN, L. CROOTOF, M. GOLDFARB, K. KEENAN, M. KORPER, & M.
TRIFFIN, AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON NEW AND EXPANDED ROLES
OF HEALTH WORKERS 33-34 (1974); Rothberg, Nurse and Physician's Assistant: Issues
and Relationships, 21 NURSING OUTLOOK 154 (1973). See also A. FORD, THE PHYSICIAN'S
ASSISTANT 45 (1975).
45. 1. MURCHISON & T. NICHOLS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF NURSING PRACTICE 247-48
(1970).
46. See generally V. HALL, STATUTORY REGULATION OF THE SCOPE OF NURSING PRAC-
TIcE-A CRITICAL SURVEY (1975); H. SULTZ, M. ZIELEZNY, & L. KINYON, LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (1976); Bullough, The Law and the Expanding Nursing
Role, 66 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 249 (1976); Mauksch, Nursing Is Coming of Age Through
the Practitioner Movement: Pro, 75 AM. J. NURSING 1834, 1842 (1975); Mereness, Recent
Trends in Expanding Roles of the Nurse, 18 NURSING OUTLOOK 30 (1970).
47. "The Legislature . . . finds that encouraging the training of primary care . . .
nurse practitioners will assist in making primary health care services more accessible to
the citizenry, and will, in conjunction with the training of family physicians, lead to an
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independent clinical decisions48 at first contact with patients before they
reach a doctor. Paradoxically, although the nurse practitioner is taking on
expanded responsibilities for patient care, the overlapping of his role
with medicine places him under the authority of the physician, 49 while
the term nurse practitioner suggests that the nurse is not subject to anoth-
er's discretion or authority but may practice independently. The chief
question, then, is whether nurse practitioners are legally "dependent" on
the physician, as their actions are subject to medical review and direc-
tion, or whether they are legally independent.5"
There is no requirement that a nurse practitioner be an employee of a
physician. 1 The-Nursing Practice Act, for example, states merely that
"[i]t is the legislative intent . . . to permit additional sharing of func-
tions within organized health care systems which provide for collabora-
tion between physicians and registered nurses.''52 While there is no
further clarification of the word "collaboration," the clause constitutes
statutory recognition that medicine and nursing are distinct professions
with regard to their independent practice, but that the functions of the two
overlap. 53 Thus, a nurse practitioner's legal relationship to his supervis-
ing physician may be that of an independent contractor as opposed to that
improved health care delivery system in California." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31910 (West
1976).
48. They are independent in that it is the nurse practitioner who can assess a patient's
medical condition, recommend and administer a specific treatment, decide that no inter-
vention other than reassurance is needed, or refer the patient to a physician. California
Joint Practice Commission Statement on Family Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care 2
(unpublished Commission Statement approved by the California Joint Practice Commis-
sion on October 18, 1975) (discussion of primary care and the assumption of responsibility
in primary care by nurse practitioners).
49. The nursing profession argues that for many years nurses in remote areas lacking
nearby physicians have functioned effectively as primary health providers, treating injury
and illness and arranging medical attention whenever situations have warranted it. See
Rogers, Nursing Is Coming of Age Through the Practitioner Movement: Con, 75 AM. J.
NURSING 1834, 1835 (1975).
50. The argument currently expounded by many in the nursing profession that nurse
practitioners are legally independent could be a sign of a movement away from the
traditional nursing model that reinforces physician responsibility and nurse subordina-
tion.
51. A search of the California codes and regulations dealing with classes of nurse
practitioners failed to reveal such a requirement.
52. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2725 (West Supp. 1978). Note that if the physician is
ultimately responsible, he is the final authority and does not function solely in a
"collaborative" role.
53. V. HALL, STATUTORY REGULATION OF THE SCOPE OF NURSING PRACTICE-A CRIT-
ICAL SURVEY 26 (1975). Because of agency theories which rebut the argument that
allied health practitioner employees are independent of physician responsibility, the
supervising physician will continue to be a target for malpractice suits. See authorities
cited note 33 supra.
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of an employee.54 If this is indeed the case, the nurse practitioner's
supervising physician would be immune from vicarious liability for the
acts of his independent contractor.55 Unless, however, the role evolves in
a manner that provides a higher degree of professional autonomy, nurse
practitioners will not be considered independent contractors.
56
In spite of the arguments of the nursing profession, the language of
A.B. 717 with regard to supervision provides that both nurse practition-
ers and physician's assistants are to function in a dependent or agency
relationship with the supervising physician. 57 A relationship of this type
suggests that the supervising physician must assume responsibility for the
proper supervision of the allied health practitioner.5 8 Neither of the two
types of allied health practitioners can be totally independent because the
bill provides that the physician must maintain general supervision. 59 This
indicates that nurse practitioners and physician's assistants are dependent
upon and accountable to the physician, as they are now entering an area
that has previously been defined as medical care. If a physician's assis-
tant or nurse practitioner were to dispense, administer, or prescribe drugs
or devices without the general supervision of a licensed physician, then
the physician's assistant or nurse practitioner would be practicing
medicine in violation of the law.' °
54. Also, it may be argued that the term "general supervision," as employed in
A.B. 717, would enable nurse practitioners to act as independent contractors. A simi-
lar argument has been made by a dental hygienist in California who separated herself
from a dentist employer and established her own office. Siegel, Dental Hygienist Braces
for Legal Test, L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1977, pt. 4, at I, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as L.A.
Times]. The legislature had enacted a new law controlling dental auxiliaries, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 1740-1767 (West Supp. 1978), which expanded the role of dental hygienists
and assistants, permitting them to work under the "general supervision" of a dentist. Id.
§§ 1757, 1759. Prior law apparently required direct supervision. Id. § 1746 (West 1974).
Linda Krol and others interpreted the new language as permitting hygienists to "work in
their own office[s]." L.A. Times, supra, at 8, col. 1. Krol was formally charged with
practicing in a place not under the control of a dentist. Legal uncertainties arise due to
disagreement over terms such as "general supervision," which are still unclear since Krol
is the first hygienist to be formally charged under the new law. The same analysis may be
applied to nurse practitioners.
55. See 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 16.03, at 491 (1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250, Comment a (1958).
56. See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
57. See Cohen & Dean, To Practice or Not to Practice: Developing State Law and
Policy on Physician Assistants, 52 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 349, 363 (1974) (re-
ferring to physician's assistants but by implication including nurse practitioners).
58. See note 33 supra.
59. Law of Sept. 15, 1977, ch. 843, §§ 1,2, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (codified at CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE §§ 2725.1, 3502.1). If a nurse practitioner or physician's assistant simply
executes legal medical standing orders, his function is a dependent one, since his perform-
ance is contingent upon physician supervision or direction.
60. See text and authorities accompanying note 23 supra.
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4. Additional Physician Liability
In addition to incurring vicarious liability based upon the respondeat
superior doctrine, the physician may be directly liable if he is found to
have been negligent in the manner in which he used his assistant. 61
Negligence of this type could consist of the physician's failure to exercise
the requisite skill and care in supervising his assistant.62 A physician may
also be culpable if he did not exercise proper care in delegating to an
assistant a task that he knew, or should have known, to be beyond the
assistant's competence, even if the assistant performed it to the best of
his ability.63 It is assumed that the physician is in the best position to
know the extent of the allied health practitioner's competence. 64 Finally,
it must be noted that the physician has an obligation to employ due care
in the selection of his assistants.65
III. WILL THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF MALPRACTICE SUITS DETER
THE UTILIZATION OF ALLIED HEALTH PRACTITIONERS?
As allied health practitioners undertake greater responsibilities, the
range of potential error attributable to this mode of providing health care
and the concomitant expanded tort liability could seriously impair effec-
tive use of these health care providers.66 It is possible that the risks of
potential physician liability for the negligent acts of allied health prac-
titioners under the respondeat superior doctrine may deter employment of
allied health practitioners. 67
In discussions with members of both the legal and medical professions
who are acutely aware of the current malpractice crisis, the author has
found that many physicians in California are anxious about the use of
allied health practitioners because as supervising physicians they retain
the legal responsibility and liability for the acts of their assistants. This
apprehension has been fueled by the uncertainties of malpractice insur-
ance coverage. The costs of inalpractice insurance in the last few years
have risen greatly. 6 Furthermore, uniform standards for malpractice
61. See Tort Liability, supra note 36, at 777-79.
62. Id. at 777 & n.44.
63. See id. at 777.
64. Cohen & Dean, To Practice or Not to Practice: Developing State Law and Policy on
Physician Assistants, 52 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 349, 361 (1974).
65. Tort Liability, supra note 36, at 777 & nn.41 & 42.
66. Id. at 780-84.
67. Id. at 781-82 (doctrine of respondeat superior creates a substantial hindrance to
health care assistant utilization).
68. See Rubsamen, Medical Malpractice, 235 SCIENTIFIC AM. 18, 22-23 (1976). The
dramatic rise in the costs of malpractice coverage was fueled by the number of claims
[Vol. 11
1978] ALLIED HEALTH PRACTITIONERS
insurance for physicians supervising allied health practitioners have not
been established. 69 Provisions for allied health practitioners vary among
different insurance companies.
70
It should be noted that the risk factors discussed herein may be
perceived by physicians as more critical than they really are. As of this
writing, the author knows of no malpractice suits brought in California
against either nurse practitioners or physician's assistants, or against
physicians operating in their supervisory capacities. The probable reason
for the absence of such suits is that physicians who employ these new
health practitioners tend to be conservative initially. Under the threat of
legal liability the physician will employ only qualified assistants71 and
will likely maintain close supervision. As confidence grows between the
physician and his assistant, the form of supervision will undoubtedly be
modified. By delineating the functions between himself and his "exten-
der," the physician should be able to protect himself. 72 In addition,
malpractice coverage for allied health practitioners seems to be a
comparatively minor cost of employing an allied health practitioner in
California. 73 With these factors in mind, the physician should not be
discouraged from using allied health practitioners by the potential legal
filed. In California the number of malpractice claims filed rose from 13.5 per 100 physi-
cians in 1965 to more than 18 per 100 physicians in 1974. CAL. ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM.
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT (1974), reprinted in Waxman, Spiraling
Costs: A Health Care Slide, 11 TRIAL 23, 23 (1975).
69. Oseran, Physician's Assistants in California, 124 W.J. MED. 258, 262 (1976).
70. Id. Several insurance companies have extended physicians' policies to cover allied
health practitioners. One California underwriter of liability insurance for physicians has
been successfully insuring physicians who employ allied health practitioners, and charges
about $84 to $100 per year. K. Cheitlin & M. Grisham, Reimbursement for Mid-Level
Practitioners: A Strategy for Increasing Health Care Efficiency 36 (Aug. 2, 1977) (unpub-
lished Governor's Intern Report in Office of Health Professions Development, Cal. Dep't
of Health, Sacramento, California).
71. In addition to legislative sanction, the fact that physician's assistants and nurse
practitioners must be graduates of approved programs allows the prospective employer to
presume that the allied health practitioner is qualified. Nurse practitioners are licensed
registered nurses who have already been subject to a standardized curriculum. See
CALIFORNIA HEALTH MANPOWER REPORT, supra note I, at 25. Regarding physician's
assistants, the California Administrative Code provides: "[N]o person shall be approved
to practice as a physician's assistant in this state without having successfully completed
the primary care physician's assistant examination of the National Commission on Certifi-
cation of Physician's Assistants." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 1379.12 (1977).
72. In this way, the allied health practitioner would be using a variant of the standard-
ized protocol, currently in use by nurse practitioners, in order to structure responsibilities.
On standardized protocols in regard to nursing practice, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
2725(d) (West Supp. 1978). The protocols permit physicians to limit the amount of
discretion exercised by an assistant to whom some elements of the practice of medicine
are delegated.
73. See note 70 supra.
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consequences resulting from the doctrine of respondeat superior. In fact,
there remain many incentives for physicians to employ allied health
practitioners, including increased net income, expanded patient care, and
increased control over working hours.74
IV. LIABILITY OF ALLIED HEALTH PRACTITIONERS
Since allied health practitioners will be assuming wide responsibilities
in primary care, which is first-contact medicine, there are various points
at which civil liability can arise. In such an environment, and under the
provisions of A.B. 717, allied health practitioners will have some discre-
tion in the various medications, drugs, or devices that they can use. If
they choose the wrong one, or the wrong dosage in the case of drugs, and
injury results to the patient, they can be held liable.75 Essential to their
role as primary health care providers is the concept of accountability to
the patient.76 The allied health practitioners must recognize and fulfill
competently their responsibilities for the care of patients.77
Neither nurse practitioners nor physician's assistants are immune to
lawsuits or legal responsibilities.78 Because of the independence incident
to their expanded roles, they can no longer rely solely upon the decisions
of their supervising physicians. The lawyer, in evaluating legal responsi-
bility, should note the share of medical responsibility taken by the allied
health practitioner. With the increase in responsibility, there is an atten-
dant increase in the exposure to civil liability.
A. Allied Health Practitioner Standard of Care
Any examination of problems of medico-legal liability must include a
discussion of what standard of care the allied health practitioner must
meet. However, since the allied health occupations are so novel, and
their practitioners are provided with opportunities to work in such varied
medical settings,79 it is difficult to determine what standards have been
74. Glenn & Hofmeister, Will Physicians Rush Out and Get Physician Extenders?, I I
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 69, 70 (1976).
75. See Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (1936).
76. See generally Abdellah, Nurse Practitioners and Nursing Practice, 66 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH 245, 245 (1976).
77. In performance of his professional duties, an allied health provider will necessarily
be required to exercise reasonable care to see that no unnecessary harm comes to the
patient. See the discussion of the allied health practitioner's standard of care in text
accompanying notes 79-86 infra.
78. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
79. A few of the medical settings within which allied health practitioners can work are
physicians' offices, clinics, health centers, industries, homes, schools, and acute care
facilities. California Joint Practice Commission Statement on Family Nurse Practitioners
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established in practice. In addition, there is a lack of legal precedent
specifically involving these allied health practitioners. It is therefore not
clear by what standard of care they will be judged.80
Further, although A.B. 717 appears to promote similarity of func-
tion between nurse practitioners and physician's assistants in the
dispensation, prescription, and administration of drugs or devices,
specialization exists within each of the allied health occupations. 81 With-
in both of the occupations, individual practitioners perform different
tasks at different levels.82
Still, to succeed in court, an injured patient must show that the allied
health practitioner failed to live up to a required standard of care. Since
the functions to be performed by the allied health practitioners under
A.B. 717 involve the exercise of a special skill, the usual standard, what
a reasonable person would do in similar circumstances, would probably
not be applied. Because a physician's assistant or nurse practitioner83
would be performing functions that have previously been within the
exclusive sphere of a physician's medical practice, the standards to
which physicians are held would likely be applied. 84 The California
in Primary Care 4 (unpublished Commission Statement approved by the California Joint
Practice Commission on October 18, 1975) (referring to family nurse practitioners but by
implication including allied health practitioners).
80. The California Health & Safety Code establishes the standard of care of trainees,
including nurse practitioners and physician's assistants, in Health Manpower Pilot Pro-
jects: "A trainee and his supervisor shall be held to the standard of care of an individual
otherwise legally qualified to perform the health care service or services performed by
such trainee or supervisor." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 429.74 (West Supp. 1978).
However, this code section has not been interpreted by the courts. In addition, the
statutory language is ambiguous as to whether allied health practitioners must conform to
the standards of acceptable practice for the supervising physician or must only meet the
standard of care of a legally qualified allied health practitioner. Such ambiguity furnishes
no assistance in forecasting how the courts will hold with regard to the standard of care
required of allied health practitioners.
81. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 1379.40-.86 (1977), which outlines the
specialty levels of physician's assistants in California. They are (1) orthopedic physician's
assistant, (2) emergency care physician's assistant, (3) allergy physician's assistant, and
(4) specialist physician's assistant. Id.
82. Differences in practice settings require that personnel with the same general back-
ground perform in vastly different ways. The uses of the allied health practitioners are as
varied as the types of practice settings. See note 79 supra.
83. There is no indication whether "the reasonable nurse practitioner" is a general
standard or one more specifically delimited by a consideration of the level of nursing
proficiency. See generally Note, The Negligent Nurse: Rx for the Medical Malpractice
Victim, 12 TULSA L.J. 104 (1976).
84. Where an individual undertakes to practice medicine, he is held to the standard of
care of a physician. Cf. Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 784 (2d Cir. 1969) (doctor
practicing without a license held to the standard of care of a qualified licensed practition-
er). Although this case was based on New York law, it is often cited for the above-
mentioned general principle.
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courts will probably advance a proposition similar to one suggested here
by .the author: allied health practitioners, when they perform procedures
which have been considered as within the sole province of medical
practice, must possess and exercise in diagnosis and treatment that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and
exercised by medical practitioners under similar circumstances.8 5 Thus,
where an allied health practitioner enters into an area traditionally charac-
terized as medical care, the courts will find it reasonable to hold the allied
health practitioner to a physician's standard of care.
86
B. Liability for Unauthorized Treatment-Lack of Informed Consent
An injured patient has a cause of action against an allied health
practitioner for treatment, including the administration, dispensation,
and prescription of drugs or devices,87 to which he did not consent.
Traditionally, the doctrine of informed consent has been applied to the
physician-patient relationship.88 However, with new medical respon-
sibilities being delegated to allied health practitioners, it is easy to
foresee an extension of that doctrine to the allied health practitioner-
patient relationship.
The requirement of informed consent to medical procedures has al-
ways been recognized as a key element in the medical practitioner-patient
relationship.89 Legal liability is imposed not because the treatment was
85. This proposition was developed by the author by extrapolating the present standard
of care in California for physicians to allied health practitioners. The California courts
require only that "physicians and surgeons exercise in diagnosis and treatment that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by
members of the medical profession under similar circumstances." Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.
2d 749, 753, 205 P.2d 3, 5 (1949); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 975, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 381, 390 (1971).
86. It seems both reasonable and logical that when a task that is ordinarily performed
by a physician is performed by a nonphysician, the latter would be held to the physician's
higher standard of care. See note 84 supra.
87. Th6 use of drugs is a distinct type of treatment. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 1066 (4th Law. ed. 1976) (defining "pharmacotherapy").
88. See Beloud, The Growing Importance of Informed Consent, 13 CAL. TRIAL LAW,
A.J. 39 (1973-74).
89. Poran, Authority for Medical Treatment: Consent, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 9 7.2
(Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. 1975). See also D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
§ 2.4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HARNEY]; A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 225
(1975); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628
(1970). An exception to the requirement of informed consent arises in emergency situa-
tions. HARNEY, supra, § 2.3(B). If the treating practitioner is confronted with a person
whose medical condition is so critical as to demand immediate care or treatment to protect
his life or health, an emergency exists upon which that practitioner may rely as a
justification for treating the person without first obtaining the normally required consent.
See Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 781, 208 P.2d 68, 71 (1949); CAL. ADMIN.
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rendered in a negligent manner but because the patient's legally protected
interest was invaded without his consent.' Usually, the protected legal
interest is bodily integrity, and unauthorized invasion of that interest is
technically a battery.91 The rule imposing liability for battery is applica-
ble even where consent is given if such consent is not informed or
knowledgeable,92 or if a substantially different treatment from that for
which consent was obtained is performed.93 In addition to the lawsuits
founded on battery, many of the actions alleging lack of informed
consent are brought upon a theory of negligence.94 In the suits founded
on negligence, the argument is made that the medical practitioner who
fails to properly inform his patient of the procedure to be performed has
failed to meet his duty of care.95
The standard and scope of the consent has been left to judicial determi-
nation. 96 The California courts have developed the proposition that if a
medical practitioner-and probably also an allied health practitioner-
withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
and informed consent, the practitioner opens himself to liability. 97 The
California Supreme Court has held that the duty to disclose such facts is
imposed by law because of the fiduciary relationship between medical
CODE tit. 16, § 1379.2 (1977) (a patient's informed consent must be obtained by a
physician's assistant except for emergency services).
90. Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1969). A
medical practitioner is accountable for any injury resulting from unauthorized treatment
even though it was skillfully performed. Id.
91. Pedesky v. Bleiberg, 251 Cal. App. 2d 119, 124, 59 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1967);
Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal. App. 2d 212, 233, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537, 551 (1964); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (4th ed. 1971).
92. Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1969).
93. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239, 502 P.2d 1, 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511 (1972).
94. "[W]hen an undisclosed potential complication results. . ., the courts are divided
on the issue of whether this should be deemed to be a battery or negligence." Id.
95. See id. at 240-41, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512. See also Beloud, The Growing
Importance of Informed Consent, 13 CAL. TRIAL LAW. A.J. 39 (1973-74).
96. For a good treatment of consent requirements and the standards enunciated by the
California courts, see E. WALLACH & W. BOONE, CALIFORNIA TORT GUIDE §§ 8.8-.9 (Cal.
Continuing Educ. Bar Prac. Book No. 50, 1971 & Supp. 1975).
97. Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 804, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 77 (1969). Note that
the person giving the consent must himself have the legal capacity to do so. For this
reason the law provides that in an emergency situation consent is implied, Wheeler v.
Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 781, 208 P.2d 68, 71 (1949), and if the patient is a minor or
incompetent the prerogative to consent is transferred to the patient's closest available
relative or legal guardian. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 514 (1972). In all other cases, the patient's consent must result from a decision
reached after his consideration of the risks and consequences which the medical or health
care practitioner has explained. See Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The
Right to Be Informed, 8 U.S.F. L. REv. 261 (1973).
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practitioner and patient. 98 The court held further that when a procedure
inherently involves a known potential for death or serious bodily harm, it
is the medical practitioner's absolute duty to inform the patient of the
possibility of such a consequence and to describe in lay terms the
potential complications ." Where the possibility of death or serious bodi-
ly harm from the procedure is not great, the medical practitioner has a
duty to disclose only such risks as a skilled practitioner of good standing
would provide under the circumstances."o But there is no duty to discuss
the comparatively minor risks inherent in common procedures, when
such procedures seldom have serious results.101 Even with the guidelines
enunciated by the courts, there will remain the question of just how much
information a medical or health care practitioner may have to disclose
before obtaining consent to a medical procedure.
10 2
Although the issue is not often litigated, a physician who prescribes
drugs must obtain informed consent. 10 3 Again, the standards applied to
the physician in this case will likely be attached to the physician-
extending allied health practitioner. Since the allied health practitioners
will be in the best position to present the necessary warnings to the
patient, the courts will probably impose an obligation to convey the
information to the patient.'14
Another problem in the area of informed consent is that a patient might
consent to a treatment rendered by an allied health practitioner under a
false assumption about the identity of the practitioner.10 5 Whether the
false assumption results from misrepresentation, misperception, or omis-
98. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14
(1972).
99. Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
100. Id. at 244-45, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
101. Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 1I, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
102. The supreme court notes that "[t]he scope of the disclosure required of physicians
defies simple definition." Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
103. Zaslow, Informed Consent in Medical Practice, 22 THE PRAC. LAW. 13, 22 (1976).
104. Id. at 23 (referring to physicians but by implication including allied health prac-
titioners). See Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964), where the
court held that prescription drug warnings from a drug manufacturer need only go to the
physician. "[I]f adequate warning of pdtential dangers of a drug has been given to doctors,
there is no duty by the drug manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the doctor's
patient for whom the drug is prescribed." Id. at 395, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
105. Such a legal consideration clearly prompted the adoption of § 1379.28 of the
California Administrative Code, which requires that "[w]hen rendering medical services,
a physician's assistant shall at all times wear an identification badge on an outer garment
and in plain view, which shall state the assistant's name and . . . title . . . ." CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 1379.28 (1977). While working, nurse practitioners as well as
physician's assistants should be clearly identified as such to avoid the likelihood that a
patient may mistake them for physicians.
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sion, the patient's consent is not "informed." In such a case, the allied
health practitioner may incur liability for unauthorized treatment if the
practitioner's tasks involved a touching of the patient's body, as when
administering a drug or device.1°6
With respect to the form of the consent, there is no legal requirement
that the consent be in writing. 107 It need not even be expressed in words;
in many cases it will be inferred from conduct.0 8 Nevertheless, a physi-
cian's assistant or nurse practitioner would be unwise to assume that
merely because a patient has consulted him about a medical complaint,
the patient has impliedly consented to treatment for it. In many cases it
would be desirable for the consent to be in writing.' 9 With major
procedures, it is particularly desirable for details to be included in a
written form of consent.
10
C. Liability for Failure to Refer
An alternative theory for allied health practitioner liability is failure to
refer. When a patient avails himself of the services of an allied health
practitioner, he has the right to expect the practitioner to be competent. I 1
When the allied health practitioner encounters a problem beyond his
competence, he has a duty to consult a physician" 2 or refer his case to a
physician."3
The primary care in rural and inner city settings provides the climate
for the allied health practitioner to function independently in terms of the
decisions he makes. This would include the determination of whether or
106. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (4th ed. 1971).
107. Id. § 18.
108. Bradford v. Winter, 215 Cal. App. 2d 448, 454, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246 (1963);
Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 38-39, 224 P.2d 808, 811 (1950).
109. "A patient will be presumed to have comprehended the nature, terms, and effect
of a written consent to treatment." HARNEY, supra note 89, § 2.2(B).
110. This is so because the allied health practitioner would be represented by his
records and could rely on the presumption that the patient has been properly informed.
See note 109 supra.
I 1. In the case of a physician, the patient has the right to assume that the physician, if
he is not competent, will refer him to those who are most properly qualified to attend his
medical problem. Batty v. Arizona State Dental Bd., 57 Ariz. 239, 254, 112 P.2d 870, 877
(1941). This duty will, in all likelihood, be extended to allied health practitioners.
112. It may also be necessary to determine if a specialist must be consulted. If the allied
health practitioner failed to refer to or consult a specialist when he had a duty to do so, he
would have to conform to the standard of the specialist. See text and cases cited in E.
WALLACH & W. BOONE, CALIFORNIA TORT GUIDE § 8.3 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar Prac.
Book No. 50, 1971 & Supp. 1975). Specialists, in turn, are held to higher standards than
the general medical practitioner. See HARNEY, supra note 89, § 3.6.
113. See Tort Liability, supra note 36, at 776. Cf. Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 758,
205 P.2d 3, 8 (1949) (jury instruction implying a duty to consult or refer).
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not a patient's condition is within the practitioner's competence or
requires referral."' The allied health practitioner's duty is arguably
fulfilled when he employs skills commensurate with his training, and
refers or reports all needs beyond his competence to the supervising
physician.
The duty to refer, as well as the other duties imposed upon allied
health practitioners, is not an extraordinary imposition of tort liability
upon these novel health care providers. It is applied on the assumption
that both physician's assistants and nurse practitioners are governed by
the same general principles of tort liability that apply to physicians.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislation in the field of health care services should be flexible
enough to allow for the expanding and changing roles of the allied health
occupations, while at the same time insuring patient safety. At stake is
the viability of California's health care system.
If the past is a guide, definitive solutions to the current problems in this
area will come slowly. Nevertheless, A.B. 717 is a response to the
current need for improved medical and health care through an enlarged
source of health manpower. It is a positive move toward alleviating the
shortage of health care personnel in rural and inner city health care
deficient areas. This legislation is flexible enough to permit the best use
of the talents of allied health practitioners without complicated rules and
regulations. The primary legal control will remain the law of malprac-
tice. A.B. 717 will insure the legality of the allied health practitioner's
performance while assuring that the patient's welfare is safeguarded.
The general impact of this recent legislative scheme was examined
here to show the legal practitioner potential legal consequences. As
society weighs the benefits received, the bringing of needed services
into areas which otherwise would probably not be reached, against the
costs of potential legal ramifications, the benefits will clearly tip the
scales. 1A A
114. Tort Liability, supra note 36, at 776.
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